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Abstract
We present a new type of monotone submodular functions: multi-peak submodular functions. Roughly
speaking, given a family of sets F , we construct a monotone submodular function f with a high value
f(S) for every set S ∈ F (a “peak”), and a low value on every set that does not intersect significantly
any set in F .
We use this construction to show that a better than (1 − 1
2e
)-approximation (≃ 0.816) for welfare
maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations is (1) impossible in the communica-
tion model, (2) NP-hard in the computational model where valuations are given explicitly. Establishing
a constant approximation hardness for this problem in the communication model was a long-standing
open question. The valuations we construct for the hardness result in the computational model depend
only on a constant number of items, and hence the result holds even if the players can answer arbitrary
queries about their valuation, including demand queries.
We also study two other related problems that received some attention recently: max-min allocation
(for which we also get hardness of (1− 1
2e
+ ǫ)-approximation, in both models), and combinatorial public
projects (for which we prove hardness of ( 3
4
+ǫ)-approximation in the communication model, and hardness
of (1− 1
e
+ ǫ)-approximation in the computational model, using constant size valuations).
1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction there are k players and a set of M items (|M | = m). Each players i has a
valuation function vi : 2
M → R+. In this paper we use the standard assumption that the valuation functions
are non-decreasing and that vi(∅) = 0. The goal is to find an allocation of the items (S1, . . . , Sk) to maximize
the social welfare Σivi(Si). There is extensive literature on combinatorial auctions, and the two most popular
lines of research in this area are the design of computationally efficient truthful mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions and the development of (non-truthful) approximation algorithms (for various restricted classes of
valuations, such as subadditive [13, 10] or submodular [21, 16]). This paper belongs to the latter type.
Specifically, we consider the case where the valuation functions are submodular, and ask what is the best
approximation of the optimum social welfare that is achievable in polynomial time. The case of players with
submodular valuations unique because of two reasons. First, submodular valuations have a natural economic
interpretation of decreasing marginal utilities. Second, the rich literature on submodular optimization makes
the study of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations an ideal midway point for the exchange of
techniques and ideas between algorithmic game theory and combinatorial optimization.
We would like our algorithms to run in time that is polynomial in k and m. However, in a naive
representation of the valuation function we may have to specify one number for each possible bundle, so
the total size is exponential in m. Algorithms for combinatorial auctions usually assume that the valuations
are represented by oracles. The algorithm is assumed to make only a polynomial number of queries to the
oracles. Popular queries include the value query (given a set S, what is v(S)?) and the stronger demand
oracle (given prices p1, . . . , pm return a bundle S ∈ argmax v(S)−Σi∈Spi). The state of the art is an (1−1/e)-
approximation that uses value queries only [26] (which is optimal in the value oracle model [19, 22]), and a
1
(1−1/e+δ)-approximation that uses demand queries only [17] (where δ > 0 is some small constant). As one
can observe from these results, different oracles may potentially enable us to obtain different approximation
ratios. Our goal in this paper is to prove hardness results that will hold for every oracle.
The literature contains two approaches to deal with this issue:
• Communication complexity: Nisan and Segal pioneered this approach [24, 25]. Players can trans-
mit any information and thus answer any possible oracle query, but the number of bits transmitted is
polynomially bounded. The algorithm and the players are conservatively assumed to be computation-
ally unbounded.
• Constant-size valuations: This approach was introduced in [17]. Each player has a valuation
function that depends non-trivially only on a constant number of items, and its full description is
available to the algorithm (so any query whose answer depends only on the valuation can be answered
in constant time – see a discussion in [16]). The algorithm is required to run in polynomial time.
The two approaches are conceptually at two opposite ends of the spectrum: either arbitrarily complex
valuations and infinite computational power, limited only by the communication bottleneck, or extremely
succinct valuations and a polynomial-time algorithm.
1.1 Our Main Result: The Hardness of Welfare Maximization
We prove the following hardness result for welfare maximization, with the same factor in both models.
Theorem 1.1. For welfare maximization with submodular valuations, a (1− 12e + ǫ)-approximation for any
constant ǫ > 0 requires exponential communication. For constant-size submodular valuations, a (1− 12e + ǫ)-
approximation would imply P = NP .
We note that previously, only (1 − o(1))-hardness was known in the communication complexity model,
and we show the first constant-factor hardness in this model (this question was open since the seminal
paper of Nisan and Segal [25]). In particular, this settles affirmatively a conjecture of [10]. NP-hardness of
(1− ρ)-approximation for some very small ρ > 0 was known for constant-size submodular valuations [16].
Each of our results implies hardness of (1− 12e+ǫ)-approximation in the demand oracle model, because de-
mand queries can be simulated in polynomial communication, and because demand queries can be efficiently
implemented for constant-size valuations. This improves the known NP-hardness of (1516+ǫ)-approximation in
the demand oracle model by Chakrabarty and Goel [8]. We stress that our results apply to any “reasonable”
oracle model and not just to the demand oracle model; see also the discussion in [16].
We remark that the communication complexity result holds even for a constant number of players, in the
sense that for every ǫ > 0 there is some fixed k ≥ 2 such that the hardness result holds for k players. For
the special case of 2 players, we get the following.
Theorem 1.2. For welfare maximization with 2 players with submodular valuations, a (1718+ǫ)-approximation
for any ǫ > 0 requires exponential communication.
For constant-size valuations, we clearly need a superconstant number of players, otherwise the problem
can be solved in constant time.
1.2 Our Techniques
At the heart of our hardness proofs is a new construction of submodular functions, which has been the
stumbling block of previous attempts to prove similar results. We call these multiple-peak submodular func-
tions: given a family of (possibly overlapping, exponentially many) sets F , we want a monotone submodular
function with high value f(S) for every set S ∈ F (a “peak”), and a low value on every set that does not
intersect significantly any set in F . The precise parameters depend on the family F , in particular how much
the sets in F are allowed to overlap. As an aside, this construction goes in the opposite direction to the
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Problem Approximation CC hardness (2 players) CC hardness NP-hardness
submodular welfare 1− 1/e+ δ 17/18 1− 1/(2e) 1− 1/(2e)
submodular max-min∗ 1− 1/e 17/18 1− 1/(2e) 1− 1/(2e)
submodular CPP 1− 1/e 7/8 3/4 1− 1/e
Figure 1: Summary of our hardness results: “CC hardness” refers to communication complexity, or more precisely
inapproximability under polynomial communication, and “NP-hardness” refers to inapproximability for constant-size
valuation functions. The approximation results shown here are in the demand oracle model for submodular welfare
[17], in the value oracle model for submodular max-min allocation (∗for a constant number of players) [9], and in the
value oracle model for submodular CPP [23]. In the value oracle model, 1− 1/e is optimal for all 3 problems.
(very different) construction of Balcan and Harvey [4], where a submodular function is constructed that has
very low value on a given family of sets.
This construction is then leveraged in two possible ways: for communication complexity, we use the
general framework introduced by Nisan [24]. We use the probabilistic method to prove the existence of
an exponentially large family F and show a reduction from the Set Disjointness problem. Each player has
a multiple-peak submodular valuation corresponding to a family Fi, where either there is a choice of sets
Si ∈ Fi that are “consistent” (disjoint/equal, depending on the problem), or not - distinguishing these two
cases requires exponential communication.
For NP-hardness results, we start from Feige’s proof of inapproximability of Max k-cover [14]. Then we
use the coverage system to construct an instance with multi-peak submodular functions. In the YES case,
the instance contains matching sets, providing high value for each player, while in the NO case, some players
are forced to receive low value. In addition, Feige’s construction guarantees that the valuation functions
depend only on a constant (albeit large) number of items. Hence the computational hardness result applies
even if the bidders have constant-size valuations.
1.3 Other Results
We use the new multiple-peak submodular functions to prove hardness results for every oracle in two other
related settings. One is Combinatorial Public Projects (CPP), where we seek a single set S of at most k
items, maximizing
∑n
i=1 vi(S). Another one is the Max-min Allocation Problem, where we want to allocated
disjoint sets of items Si in order to maximize min1≤i≤k vi(Si).
Combinatorial Public Projects. For CPP there is an (1 − 1/e)-approximation that can be achieved
using value queries only [23]. We show that this is optimal in any arbitrarily powerful oracle model even for
constant size valuation, hence strengthening previous result that showed that this result cannot be improved
using demand queries [6]. We note that the situation is different for the welfare maximization, where
1 − 1/e is optimal for value queries but not optimal if demand queries are allowed [17]. No constant-factor
communication complexity hardness was previously known for the CPP problem.
Theorem 1.3. For the CPP problem with submodular valuations, a (34 + ǫ)-approximation for any ǫ > 0
requires exponential communication. For 2 players with submodular valuations, a (78 + ǫ)-approximation for
any ǫ > 0 requires exponential communication. For constant-size submodular valuations, a (1 − 1e + ǫ)-
approximation would imply P = NP .
Max-min Allocation. Finally, our results for Welfare Maximization also apply to the Submodular Max-
min Allocation problem. The problem of obtaining a max-min allocation was quite heavily studied recently
[5, 3, 12, 2, 7], and most of the work concentrated on cases where the valuations are special cases of sub-
modular valuations. It is known that the Submodular Max-min Allocation problem admits a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-
approximation for any fixed ǫ > 0 and any fixed number of players k [9], and this is optimal in the value
oracle model, if we want approximation independent of k [22]. Our hardness results also hold for a fixed
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number of players k (approaching 1 − 12e for k fixed but large), and they are independent of a particular
oracle model. When the number of players is not fixed, the problem is less understood, and the best known
approximation is O(m1/2+ǫ) [18, 7].
Theorem 1.4. For Max-min Allocation with submodular valuations, a (1− 12e+ǫ)-approximation for any ǫ >
0 requires exponential communication. For constant-size submodular valuations, a (1− 12e+ǫ)-approximation
would imply P = NP . For Max-min Allocation with 2 players with submodular valuations, a (1718 + ǫ)-
approximation for any ǫ > 0 requires exponential communication.
The proof is obtained by a straightforward adaption of the proof for Welfare Maximization, as we explain
in Section 4.3.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the necessary prelimi-
naries. In Section 3, we present the construction of multiple-peak submodular functions, the main technical
ingredient of our proofs. In Section 4, we present the proofs for Welfare Maximization, and we also note why
they apply to Max-min Allocation. In Section B, we present the proofs for Combinatorial Public Projects.
2 Preliminaries
A function f : {0, 1}n → R is submodular if f(A) + f(B) ≥ f(A ∪ B) + f(A ∩ B) for all A,B (and
sets are naturally identified with {0, 1} vectors). By calling a function monotone, we mean non-decreasing,
i.e. f(A) ≤ f(B) for all A ⊆ B. We use the following connection between continuous and discrete submodular
functions (slightly modifying the conditions used in [20] and [27], where “smooth submodular functions” were
used).
Definition 2.1. We call a function F : [0, 1]n → R continuous submodular, if all of the following conditions
hold:
• F is absolutely continuous1 on every line segment of direction ei, for every i.
• The partial derivative ∂F∂xi is defined almost everywhere on every line segment of direction ei.
• ∂F∂xi is non-increasing with respect to every coordinate.
Lemma 2.2. If F : [0, 1]n → R is continuous submodular, then its restriction to {0, 1}n is submodular.
Proof. Since F is absolutely continuous, we can express differences between point values by integrating the
partial derivatives: assuming that x ∈ {0, 1}n and xi = xj = 0,
F (x+ ei)− F (x) =
∫ 1
0
∂F
∂xi
∣∣∣
x+tei
dt.
Since ∂F∂xi is non-increasing with respect to every coordinate, in particular xj , we get
F (x+ ei + ej)− F (x+ ej) ≤ F (x+ ei)− F (x).
This means that F restricted to {0, 1}n is submodular.
In this paper, (x)+ = max{x, 0} denotes the positive part of a number. We remark that when we write
(x)2+, we mean (max{x, 0})
2, i.e. for x < 0 this quantity is 0.
1A function F : R → R is absolutely continuous if for every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 such that whenever
∑
i
|xi − yi| < δ,∑
i
|F (xi)− F (yi)| < ǫ.
4
3 Construction of Multiple-Peak Submodular Valuations
In this section, we construct a new class of submodular functions. These functions are the main technical
elements of our hardness results. Given a family of sets F , we would like to define a function that has a high
value on each set in F , and low value on every set that does not overlap any set in F very much. We call
these functions multiple-peak submodular valuations.
The construction is inspired by the “continuous point of view”, which has been used in previous work
on submodular optimization [22, 26, 27], and the connection between continuous and discrete submodular
functions given by Lemma 2.2. Suppose we start from a continuous submodular function F : [0, 1]M → R+
that depends only on the sum of coordinates
∑
xi, in particular F (x) = 1− (1− a
∑
xi)
2
+. In addition, we
have a collection F of vertices of the hypercube that should become the “peaks” of the function, i.e. their
value should be increased compared to F (x). We define a region of the hypercube BA ⊂ [0, 1]
M around each
vertex A ∈ F , such that these regions are disjoint. Then if we modify the function F so that it is continuous
submodular on each region separately, and first partial derivatives are continuous on the boundary of each
region, then the resulting function is still continuous submodular. Crucially, we can perform this operation
on each region BA independently, since there is no interaction between different (disjoint) regions, due to the
local nature of continuous submodularity - we only have to ensure that first partial derivatives are continuous
on the boundary of each region.
In particular, consider a region defined by BA = {x ∈ [0, 1]M :
∑
i∈A xi −
∑
i/∈A xi > b}. We can define
FA(x) = 1 − (1 − a(2
∑
i∈A xi − b))+(1 − a(2
∑
i/∈A xi + b))+. This function is continuous submodular on
BA. Moreover, it agrees with F (x) on the boundary of BA and also its first partial derivatives are the same.
Therefore, we can glue the two functions seamlessly at the boundary of BA and the resulting function is still
continuous submodular.
A discrete formulation of this idea follows.
Definition 3.1. A set S ⊆ M is said to be b-close to a set A, if |S ∩ A| − |S \ A| > b. More generally, a
point x ∈ [0, 1]M is b-close to A, if
∑
i∈A xi −
∑
i/∈A xi > b.
Note that S being b-close to A is the same as the characteristic vector 1S being b-close to A.
Proposition 3.2. Let A,A′ ⊆M be two sets such that |A∩A′| ≤ b. Then every point x ∈ [0, 1]M is b-close
to at most one of the two sets A,A′. In particular, every set S ⊆M is b-close to at most one of A,A′.
Proof. Suppose towards contradiction that x is b-close to both A and A′. That is,
∑
i∈A xi −
∑
i/∈A xi > b
and
∑
i∈A′ xi −
∑
i/∈A′ xi > b. Adding up these two inequalities, we get
2b < (
∑
i∈A
xi −
∑
i/∈A
xi) + (
∑
i∈A′
xi −
∑
i/∈A′
xi)
= (
∑
i∈A
xi −
∑
i/∈A
xi +
∑
i∈A
xi −
∑
i∈A
xi) + (
∑
i∈A′
xi −
∑
i/∈A′
xi +
∑
i∈A′
xi −
∑
i∈A′
xi)
= (2
∑
i∈A
xi −
∑
i
xi) + (2
∑
i∈A
xi −
∑
i
xi)
= 2
∑
i∈A
xi + 2
∑
i∈A′
xi − 2
∑
i
xi
= 2
∑
i∈A∩A′
xi + 2
∑
i∈A∪A′
xi − 2
∑
i
xi ≤ 2|A ∩A
′| ≤ 2b
We have reached a contradiction and therefore x is close to at most one of the sets.
Definition 3.3. A family of sets F ⊂ 2M is called b-intersecting if |A ∩A′| ≤ b for all A,A′ ∈ F , A 6= A′.
Definition 3.4 (Multiple-Peak Submodular Valuation). Let F be a b-intersecting family and a > 0 some
constant. A function f is called (F , a, b)-multiple-peak function if it is defined as follows:
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1. For a set S that is b-close to some A ∈ F (unique by the above),
f(S) = 1− (1− a(2|S ∩ A| − b))+(1− a(2|S \A|+ b))+.
2. For a set S that is not b-close to any A ∈ F ,
f(S) = 1− (1− a|S|)2+.
Lemma 3.5. For every constant a > 0 and every b-intersecting family F , the (F , a, b)-multiple-peak function
f (as defined in Definition 3.4) is monotone and submodular.
Proof. We define the following function F : [0, 1]M → R+:
F (x) = 1− (1− a
∑
i
xi)
2
+.
One can verify that this function is continuous submodular, because it is absolutely continuous and its partial
derivatives are non-increasing. In addition, for each A ∈ F , we define
FA(x) = 1− (1− a(2
∑
i∈A
xi − b))+(1− a(2
∑
i/∈A
xi + b))+
Again, it is easy to see that FA is continuous submodular, by checking that its partial derivatives are
non-increasing.
Define BA = {x ∈ [0, 1]M :
∑
i∈A xi −
∑
i/∈A xi > b}, i.e. the region b-close to A. We know that these
regions are disjoint for A ∈ F . We define a function F˜ (x) to be equal to FA(x) for x ∈ BA, and equal to
F (x) when x /∈ BA for any A ∈ F .
We need to prove that F˜ is a continuous submodular function. Since F and FA are continuous submodular
functions, we only have to verify that they agree on the boundary of BA up to first partial derivatives. Note
that the boundary of BA intersects any axis-parallel line segment in at most one point. Therefore this will
imply that on any line segment parallel to ei, F˜ is absolutely continuous,
∂F
∂xi
is defined almost everywhere,
and it is non-increasing with respect to every coordinate. Therefore, F˜ is continuous submodular.
For each boundary point x of BA, we have 2
∑
i∈A xi − b = 2
∑
i/∈A xi + b =
∑
i xi. Therefore, FA(x) =
F (x). In addition, if 1 − a
∑
i xi ≤ 0, then F (x) = FA(x) = 1 and all partial derivatives are 0. Finally,
assume that 1− a
∑
i xi > 0. For j ∈ A we have
∂FA
∂xj
= 2a(1− a(2
∑
i/∈A
xi + b)) = 2a(1− a
∑
i
xi) =
∂F
∂xj
.
Similarly, for j /∈ A, we have
∂FA
∂xj
= 2a(1− a(2
∑
i∈A
xi − b)) = 2a(1− a
∑
i
xi) =
∂F
∂xj
.
Hence F and FA agree on the boundary of BA up to their first partial derivatives.
Therefore, F˜ is a continuous submodular function and also monotone (non-decreasing). By Lemma 2.2, its
restriction to {0, 1}M is monotone submodular. This is the multi-peak submodular function of Definition 3.4.
4 Welfare Maximization
In this section we prove our three results regarding welfare maximization: for every constant ǫ > 0, a
(1− 12e + ǫ)-approximation requires exponential communication, for 2 players, a
17
18 + ǫ requires exponential
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communication and that for constant-size submodular valuations, a (1− 12e + ǫ)-approximation would imply
P = NP . We then note why the same proof implies hardness result for max-min allocations (Theorem 1.4).
All results share the same basic ideas and use multi-peak submodular functions. The multi-peak submodular
functions are defined using a special kind of a set system:
Definition 4.1. A collection of sets S ⊂ 2M that is partitioned into groups S1, . . . ,Sk is called well struc-
tured if all of the following holds:
• The total number of elements in the universe is m = k · s.
• There is some number s such that for each set S ∈ S, |S| = s.
• |S1| = . . . = |Sk|.
• There exists some b such that for every i ∈ [k] and every S, S′ ∈ Si, we have |S ∩ S′| ≤ b.
Given a well structured collection, we identify the k groups of sets with k players. The set of items is
M . For each player i, we define a (Si, a, b)-multi-peak submodular valuation function vi : 2M → R+. The
precise choice of a, b is application specific and will be given later.
We will say that an instance is a YES instance if there exist k disjoint sets, one from each group Si,
whose union is M . An instance is a NO instance if for any choice of ℓ ≤ k sets, their union covers at most a
(1− (1 − 1/k)ℓ + ǫ)m items.
The inapproximability gap that we prove is the result of the intractability of distinguishing between YES
instances and NO instances. We start with calculating the welfare in YES instances. The more involved
task is to upper bound the welfare in NO instances.
Claim 4.2. The optimal welfare in a YES instance is at least k(1 − (1− a(2s− b))+(1− ab)+).
Proof. This is a YES instance so for each bidder i there is a set Si ∈ Si such that the Si’s are disjoint
and cover the universe. A feasible allocation gives Si to player i, and each player collects value vi(Si) =
1− (1− a(2s− b))+(1− ab)+. So the overall welfare of this allocation is k(1− (1− a(2s− b))+(1− ab)+).
Consider now a NO instance. There is no such choice of disjoint sets as in YES instances, and moreover
any selection of ℓ sets such that Ai ∈ Si satisfies |
⋃ℓ
i=1Ai| ≤ (1 − (1 − 1/k)
ℓ + ǫ)ks. Consider any feasible
allocation of disjoint sets (S1, . . . , Sk). For each Si, let Ai ∈ Si be the set in Si closest to Si, i.e. maximizing
|Si ∩ Ai| − |Si \Ai|. Our goal now is to upper bound the maximum welfare such allocation can achieve.
For each i, we define variables xi =
1
s |Si∩Ai|, yi =
1
s |Si \Ai|. Without loss of generality, x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3 ≥
. . . ≥ xk. For every ℓ, the first ℓ variables xi satisfy the constraint that
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ (1−(1−1/k)
ℓ+ǫ)k (arising
from the properties of the set system in NO instances). In addition, we have the constraint
∑k
i=1(xi+yi) ≤ k,
meaning that we cannot allocate more than the total number of elements, ks. The following technical lemma
bounds the value that can be obtained under these constraints. (We note that the parameters α, β in the
lemma are related to a, b by α = a · s and β = b/s.)
Lemma 4.3. Let x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk ≥ 0 be such that
• x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xk,
• for each ℓ ≤ k,
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ (1− (1 − 1/k)
ℓ + ǫ)k,
•
∑k
i=1(xi + yi) ≤ k.
Let v(x, y) = 1−(1−α(2x−β))+(1−α(2y+β))+ if x−β > y, and v(x, y) = 1−(1−α(x+y))2+ if x−β ≤ y.
Then,
k∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) ≤ max
1≤k∗≤k
2αk + 1−
α2k2
k − k∗
((1 − 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ)2
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Moreover, for k = 2 and β ≥ 14 + ǫ we have that
2∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) = 2− (1− α(2 −
1 + αβ
2α
))2+.
We defer the proof to Appendix A. Given this lemma, we obtain bounds on the ratio between YES and
NO instances.
Corollary 4.4. The ratio between the social welfare in a NO instance and a YES instance is:
• 1− 12e +O(ǫ) for α =
1
2 , β = ǫ and large enough k.
• 1718 +O(ǫ) for α =
2
3 , β =
1
2 + 2ǫ and k = 2.
Proof. We show the first part by optimizing for the best value of k∗ in the NO case: Let z = k∗/k. For large
k, we can approximate (1 − 1/k)2k
∗
≃ e−2z. Hence we maximize the function φ(z) = k − k4(1−z)e
−2z over
z ∈ (0, 1) (the rest of the terms approach 0 and we ignore them in this analysis). By elementary calculus,
φ(z) is maximized at z = 1/2, and the maximum value is φ(12 ) = k(1−
1
2e ). In other words, k
∗ = k/2 is the
best choice, and gives
k∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) = (1− e
−1/2)k +
1
2
k(1− (1− e−1/2)2) = (1−
1
2e
)k.
In the YES case, the optimum is k(1− (1−α(2−β))+(1−αβ)+) = k(1−
1
2ǫ(1−
1
2ǫ)) ≥ k(1− ǫ). Therefore,
the ratio is 1− 12e +O(ǫ).
For the second part, we choose α = 23 and β =
1
2 + 2ǫ, which gives an optimal solution in the NO case
x1 = 1 + ǫ, y1 = 0, x2 = 0, y2 = 1− ǫ. The value of this solution is
2∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) = 1 + 1− (1− αy2)
2
+ = 2− (1 −
2
3
(1− ǫ))2+ = 2− (
1
3
+
2
3
ǫ)2 ≤
17
9
.
In the YES case, as we argued, the optimum is 2(1 − (1 − α(2 − β))+(1 − αβ)+) = 2(1 − (1 −
2
3 (2 −
1
2 −
2ǫ))(1− 23 (
1
2 + 2ǫ)) = 2(1−
1
3ǫ(
2
3 −
1
3ǫ)) ≥ 2− ǫ. Therefore, the ratio is
17
18 +O(ǫ).
4.1 Communication complexity of welfare maximization
Here we prove the first part of Theorem 1.1, and Theorem 1.2: for every constant ǫ > 0, a (1 − 12e +
ǫ)-approximation requires exponential communication. For 2 players, a (1718 + ǫ)-approximation requires
exponential communication. This is the first constant-factor impossibility result for submodular valuations
in the communication model. The basic idea is to reduce from the Set Disjointness problem. In the Set
Disjointness problem there are k players, each player i holds a string xi ∈ {0, 1}t. The following theorem
establishes the hardness of Set Disjointness.
Theorem 4.5 ([1]). It requires tk4 bits to distinguish between the following two cases:
1. There exists some j such that x1j = . . . = x
k
j = 1.
2. For each two different players i and i′ and every j it holds that if xij = 1 then x
i′
j = 0.
The lower bound holds also for randomized and non-deterministic algorithms.
The plan is to reduce Set Disjointness (with an exponential t) to an instance of combinatorial auctions
with multiple-peak submodular functions. Then we would like to show that a good approximation algorithm
will let us decide the Set Disjointness problem. This will show that a good approximation algorithm requires
exponential communication. The first step is to show the existence of an exponential well-structured set
system.
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Lemma 4.6. For a universe M , |M | = ks = m and for any ǫ > 0, there is a collection of t = 2Θ(ǫ
2m/k3)
partitions Pj = (Cj1 , . . . , C
j
k) such that
• For each j ∈ [t],
⋃k
i=1 C
j
i = M .
• For each i ∈ [k], j ∈ [t], |Cji | = s.
• For any i ≤ i′ and any j, j′, |Cji ∩ C
j′
i′ | ≤
1+ǫ
k s.
• For every distinct i1, ...iℓ and any j1, . . . , jℓ, we have |C
j1
i1
∪ . . . ∪ Cjℓiℓ | ≤ (1− (1−
1
k )
ℓ + ǫ)ks.
Proof. This is a slight modification of the probabilistic construction of [11]. Consider M partitioned into s
k-tuples (er1, . . . , e
r
k), 1 ≤ r ≤ s. We generate each partition P
j as follows: from each k-tuple (er1, . . . , e
r
k),
we include each element in exacly one of the sets Cj1 , . . . , C
j
k, using an independently random bijection
{er1, . . . , e
r
k} → {C
j
1 , . . . , C
j
k}. Thus the first two conditions are satisfied by construction.
Consider any pair Cji , C
j′
i′ for i 6= i
′. Each set is generated by taking (independently) a random element
from each k-tuple (er1, . . . , e
r
k). Therefore, the probability of taking the same element is 1/k for each k-tuple
and these events are independent. The expected size of the intersection |Cji ∩C
j′
i′ | is s/k, and by the Chernoff
bound, the probability that the intersection is larger than Pr[|Cji ∩ C
j′
i′ | > (1 + ǫ)s/k] < e
−Ω(ǫ2s/k).
Similarly, consider any choice of distinct (i1, . . . , iℓ) and any (j1, . . . , jℓ). Each element appears in C
j1
i1
∪
. . .∪Cjℓiℓ with probability 1−(1−1/k)
ℓ, and hence the expected cardinality of the union is (1−(1−1/k)ℓ)ks.
We can write |Cj1i1 ∪ . . . ∪ C
jℓ
iℓ
| =
∑s
r=1Xr where Xr is the number of elements of the r-th k-tuple that are
contained in the union. The random variables Xr are independent, in the range [0, k], and hence by the
Chernoff bound Pr[
∑s
r=1Xr > (1 + ǫ)E[
∑s
r=1Xr]] < e
−Ω(ǫ2s/k).
If the number of partitions is t, we have O(tk) combinations of sets to consider. By the union bound, the
probability that any of the bad events above occurs is O(tk)e−Ω(ǫ
2s/k). For t = 2Θ(ǫ
2s/k2), the probability is
smaller than 1 and hence there is a collection of partitions satisfying the assumptions.
Given an instance of Set Disjointness, consider the following well structured collection of sets: We con-
struct Cji using Lemma 4.6 and we include C
j
i in Si if and only if x
i
j = 1. Consider the k multiple-peak
submodular functions that are based on this well structured collection of sets (with b = 1+ǫk s). Observe that
if there exists some j such that x1j = . . . = x
k
j = 1 then this is a YES instance. However, if for each two
different players i and i′ and every j it holds that if xij = 1 then x
i′
j = 0 this is a NO instance. Hence it
requires exponential amount of communication to distinguish between these two cases (even for 2 players)
and the hardness of approximation in the communication model follows from Corollary 4.4.
4.2 Computational complexity of welfare maximization
We now prove the second part of Theorem 1.1. The starting point of our reduction is Feige’s inpproximability
result for Max k-cover [14]. We summarize it here, with some additional useful properties of the set system
that arises from Feige’s reduction (see also [15] and [16] for some comments and explanations).
Hardness of Max k-cover. For any fixed ǫ > 0, it is NP-hard to distinguish the following two cases for
a given collection of sets S ⊂ 2M , partitioned into groups S1, . . . ,Sk:
1. YES case: There exist k disjoint sets, one from each group Si, whose union is the universe M .
2. NO case: For any choice of ℓ ≤ k sets, their union covers at most a (1− (1− 1/k)ℓ+ ǫ)-fraction of M .
In addition, the set system can be assumed to have the following properties:
• Every set has the same (constant) size s.
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• Each group contains the same (constant) number of sets g.
• Every element appears in the same (constant) number of sets d.
• Any two sets intersect in at most ǫs elements.
We remark that the properties up to the last two are discussed in [15, 16]. The last two properties follow
from the deterministic construction for max k-cover in [14], as follows:
The sets are unions of (L− 1)-dimensional layers in disjoint hypercubes [k′]L, where k′ is the number of
provers, and each hypercube corresponds to a particular random string r generated by the verifier. (Here,
k′ and L are both constant.) Each set corresponds to a triple (q, a, i) where q is a question, a is an answer,
and i is a prover. The direction of the layer that a set uses in a certain hypercube corresponds to the answer
a, and the position (shift) of the layer corresponds to the prover i. Given a random string r and a prover
i, the question q is determined by r and i. Therefore different sets for the same prover i, restricted to the
same hypercube r, must differ in their answer a. Hence, they are orthogonal in the respective hypercube. In
particular, for each prover i there can be at most L different sets participating in the same hypercube, one
for each dimension. As the number of provers and L are constant, there is only a constant number of sets
participating in each hypercube. As shown in [15], it can be arranged that the number of sets containing
any given element is the same, and by the above it must be a constant.
For two different provers, the respective sets restricted to one hypercube are layers indexed by a different
i, and hence they are either orthogonal or disjoint. Either way, any two different sets are either disjoint or
intersect in a 1/k′-fraction of their size in each hypercube where they both participate. Overall, two different
sets can intersect in at most a 1/k′-fraction of their elements. The number of provers k′ can be chosen large
enough so that 1/k′ ≤ ǫ (in any case k′ has to increase as ǫ→ 0, for other reasons).
Reduction. We describe a reduction from the Max k-cover problem to a combinatorial auction with
submodular valuations which works as follows. Given an instance of Max k-cover as above, we identify the k
groups of sets with k players. The set of items is the universeM . For each player i, we define a multiple-peak
submodular valuation function vi : 2
M → R+. The size of each set in Si is s (a constant), and the number of
sets is g, also a constant. Hence, the set system Si covers only a constant number of elements ≤ sg, and we
apply the construction of Definition 3.4 only to these elements (i.e. other elements have value 0 for player
i). From the properties of the Max k-cover instance, we know that any two sets in Si can overlap in at most
ǫs elements, hence the parameter b can be set to b = ǫs. We also set a = 12s . From the hardness of Max
k-cover it follows now that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the YES and NO instances, with a ratio of
optimal values 1− 12e +O(ǫ) due to Corollary 4.4.
4.3 Max-min allocation
We note that the same proofs apply to the Max-min Allocation problem as well. This is because the
reduction produces instances such that in the YES case, all players receive the same value. In the NO case,
the minimum value is upper-bounded by the average value over all players. Therefore, the gap in terms of
the objective min1≤i≤k vi(Si) is at least as large as in terms of welfare maximization. In fact the hardness
factors can be (slightly) improved for Max-min allocation, but we defer this to the full version of the paper.
Acknowledgment. JV wishes to thank Uri Feige, who inspired the computational-complexity part of this
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A Proof of Lemma 4.3
This section is devoted to proving Lemma 4.3. We consider some optimal solution and massage it to get the
specified bounds. The following simple claims show several structural properties that an optimal solution
can be assumed to possess.
Claim A.1. The sequence x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xk is non-zero up to a certain index k∗, xi − β > yi for i ≤ k∗
and then xi = 0 for i > k
∗.
Proof. If xi−β ≤ yi, we can assume that xi = 0 (by replacing yi by xi+yi and xi by 0, nothing changes).
Claim A.2. If xi = xj , i < j ≤ k∗ then yi = yj = 0.
Proof. Suppose that xi = xj , i < j ≤ k∗ and suppose yj ≤ yi 6= 0. The derivative
∂v
∂y at xi equals the
derivative at xk. So we can move some small amount of mass from yi to yj, while making sure that still
xj − β > yj . Observe that the value of the solution is the same. But once yi > yj , it is already more
profitable to increase xi. So the case where xi = xj is not optimal, unless yi = yj = 0.
Claim A.3. All the variables yi for i > k
∗ are equal. We denote their value by y∗.
Proof. If not, we could gain by making them equal, due to the concavity of v(0, y) = 1− (1− 12y)
2
+.
Claim A.4. For all yi < k
∗, yi = 0.
Proof. Consider some yi < k
∗ with yi > 0. Notice that xi > xk∗ (by Claim A.2 if xi = xk∗ then yi = 0), and
hence the derivative ∂v∂y at xi is smaller than the derivative
∂v
∂y at xk∗ . So moving some mass from yi to yk∗
improves the value of the optimal solution — a contradiction.
A.1 The case of 2 players
Claim A.5. k∗ ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose k∗ = 0. Then, by the previous claims we have that x1 = x2 = 0 and y1 = y2 = 1. The value
of this solution is 2 − 2(1 − α)2+. However the solution in which x1 = y2 = 1 and x2 = y1 = 0 has value
2− (1− α)2+ − (1− α(2− β))+(1− αβ)+ which is no smaller by using simple arithmetic.
Claim A.6. y1 = 0.
Proof. Suppose y1 > 0. It must be that k
∗ = 1 (by Claim A.4). If 1 − a(2x1 − b) ≤ 0 then y1 does not
bring any benefit and moving all the mass of y1 to y2 can only improve the value of the solution. Otherwise,
moving some mass from y1 to x1 (making sure that still 1−a(2x1− b) ≥ 0) will improve the optimal solution
— a contradiction.
Claim A.7. If β ≥ 12 + 2ǫ then k
∗ = 1.
Proof. By the constraints of the lemma we have that x1+ x2+ y1+ y2 ≤ 2 and x1+x2 ≤ 2(
3
4 + ǫ). Without
loss of generality, x1+x2+y1+y2 = 2, and hence x1+x2−y1−y2 = 2(x1+x2)−(x1+x2+y1+y2) ≤ 1+4ǫ.
But if k∗ = 2, summing up x1 − β > y1 and x2 − β > y2 we get x1 + x2 − y1 − y2 > 2β ≥ 1 + 4ǫ. This is a
contradiction.
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Claim A.8. x1 =
1+αβ
2α .
Proof. x1 =
1+αβ
2α is the point at which 1 − α(2x1 − β) = 0, i.e. the first player is saturated and does not
benefit from any additional items. If 1−α(2x1−β) < 0, we can move some mass from x1 to y2 and improve
the optimal solution. If 1 − α(2x1 − β) > 0, we can move some mass from x2 or y2 to x1 and improve the
optimal solution.
This implies that the following is an optimal solution: x1 =
1+αβ
2α , y2 = 2−
1+αβ
2α , x2 = y1 = 0. The first
player gets value 1, and the second player 1− (1− αy2)2+; hence the optimum is
2∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) = 1 + 1− (1− αy2)
2
+ = 2− (1− α(2 −
1 + αβ
2α
))2+.
This proves the second part of Lemma 4.3.
A.2 The case of many players
By the series of claims we proved above, we have a sequence x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xk∗ , yi = 0 for i < k∗, and
then yk∗+1 = yk∗+2 = . . . = yk = y
∗, xi = 0 for i > k
∗. The value of this solution is at most (we upper
bound the value of player k∗ by 1):
k∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) =
k∗−1∑
i=1
(1− (1− α(2xi − β))+(1 − αβ)+) + 1 +
k∑
i=k∗+1
(1 − (1− αy∗)2+)
≤
k∗−1∑
i=1
2αxi + 1 +
k∑
i=k∗+1
(1− (1 − αy∗)2+).
We have the global constraint
∑k∗
i=1 xi+
∑k
i=k∗+1 yi ≤ k, and also
∑k∗
i=1 xi ≤ k(1− (1− 1/k)
k∗ + ǫ). Subject
to these constraints, it is profitable to make the variables xi as large as possible, because they bring more
benefit than the yi variables (see the formula above). Therefore, we can assume that both constraints are
tight:
∑k∗
i=1 xi = k(1 − (1 − 1/k)
k∗ + ǫ), and
∑k
i=k∗+1 yi = (k − k
∗)y∗ = ((1 − 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ)k. Then we have
y∗ = kk−k∗ ((1 − 1/k)
k∗ − ǫ). The objective value is
k∑
i=1
v(xi, yi) ≤ 2α
k∗−1∑
i=1
xi + 1 + (k − k
∗)(1− (1− αy∗)2)
= 2αk(1− (1−
1
k
)k
∗
+ ǫ) + 1 + (k − k∗)(1− (1 −
αk
k − k∗
((1− 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ))2)
= 2αk(1− (1−
1
k
)k
∗
+ ǫ) + 1 + (k − k∗)(
2αk
k − k∗
((1− 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ)−
α2k2
(k − k∗)2
((1− 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ)2)
= 2αk + 1−
α2k2
k − k∗
((1− 1/k)k
∗
− ǫ)2.
This proves the first part of Lemma 4.3.
B Combinatorial Public Projects
Here, we prove Theorem 1.3, in two parts. Due to the similarities with welfare maximization, we only point
out the necessary differences.
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B.1 Communication complexity of CPP
We reduce from an instance of Set Disjointness to CPP with submodular valuations as follows. We use
Lemma 4.6 to construct a collection of partitions (Cj1 , . . . , C
j
k), 1 ≤ j ≤ t. The difference now is that we
use Cj1 for all k players, rather than C
j
i for player i. We include C
j
1 in collection Si if x
i
j = 1 in the Set
Disjointness instance. By Lemma 4.6, Si is a well structured collection. The valuation vi of player i is going
to be the (Si, a, b)-multiple-peak submodular function of Definition 3.4, where a =
1
2s and b =
1+ǫ
k s. The
CPP instance is going to be max{
∑k
i=1 vi(S) : |S| = s}.
In the YES case, all players share an index j such that x1j = x
2
j = . . . = x
k
j = 1, and hence C
j
1 ∈ Si for all
i ∈ [k]. Then Cj1 is a feasible solution of value vi(S
j
1) = 1− (1− a(2s− b))+(1− ab)+ = 1−
1+ǫ
2k (1−
1+ǫ
2k ) =
1−O(1/k) for each player.
In the NO case, for every index j there is at most one player i such that xij = 1; hence C
j
1 ∈ Si for at most
one player i. By Lemma 4.6, |Cj1 ∩C
j′
1 | ≤
1+ǫ
k s = b. By Proposition 3.2, any set S can be b-close to at most
one set Cj1 . Therefore, for any feasible set S, at most one player derives a value defined by a b-close set, and
all the remaining k−1 players get value defined by the formula vi(S) = 1−(1−a|S|)2+ = 1−(1−as)
2
+ = 3/4.
One player can receive value close to 1.
For a large number of players (k → ∞), the value per player tends to 1 in the YES case and 3/4 in the
NO case. Therefore, if we could approximate the CPP problem within a factor better than 3/4, we could
solve the Set Disjointness problem.
For 2 players, we still use the construction above, but we only consider the first two players. In the YES
case, both players get value close to 1. In the NO case, 1 player must get value close to 3/4, while the other
player can get value close to 1. Thus if we could approximate the CPP problem for 2 players within a factor
better than 7/8, we could solve the Set Disjointness problem.
B.2 Computational complexity of CPP
Here we prove the second part of Theorem 1.3. This is actually quite simple and does not require our
construction of multiple-peak submodular functions. The same reduction has been used in [6] to prove that
CPP is hard to approximation better than 1 − 1/e with unit-demand valuations. The only new ingredient
here is the observation that the valuation functions can be assumed to depend only on a constant number
of items. The result of [6] already implies that the factor of 1 − 1/e for CPP with submodular valuations
cannot be improved in the demand oracle model; we strengthen this to the case of constant-size valuation
functions.
Proof of Theorem 1.3, part 2. Consider an instance of Max k-cover as above. We associate players with the
elements of the universe M , and items with the sets in S. For each player e ∈ M , we define a valuation
function as follows: ve(T ) = 1 if T contains any set covering element e, and 0 otherwise. Due to the properties
of the set system, this valuation function depends non-trivially only on a constant number of items (d), and
it is a very special monotone submodular function (unit demand) of the form ve(T ) = min{|T ∩De|, 1}.
The objective function of the CPP problem is now
∑
e∈M ve(T ) which is the number of elements covered
by the sets in T . Subject to the condition |T | ≤ k, this is NP-hard to maximize within a 1−1/e+ǫ factor.
14
